divulged 22.div.0003 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Law enforcement in Wichita are 99.9% sure that the suspect they have in custody, 59-year-old Dennis Rader, is the BTK killer, but while the tone of the February 26 news conference morning was confident, very few details of the investigation were divulged.

The 46 minutes of news conference self congratulations on "catching" BTK seems a bit misplaced considering that after 30 years of so-called investigation, police were not even able to tie three victims (Wegerle, Hedge and Davis) to BTK. Let's also not forget that had it not been for his daughter, Kerri Rader, cooperating with the police before the arrest, there probably would have been no arrest. It's hard to understand how so much investigative effort on the part of Wichita police and the FBI failed to respond to the obvious clues in Rader's past that tied in with the profile that had been developed for BTK:

* He went to Wichita State University, where one BTK letter was photocopied and a Professor P.J. Wyatt had exposed in her classes the poem "Oh, Death" from which BTK created one of his poems.
* He was in the Air Force. It was long speculated that BTK got the letters from "Born To Kill," a USAF squadron term. He may have met BTK victim Joseph Otero, also in the Air Force at that time.
* He worked at Coleman's, where two other victims worked
* He is an odd guy with a need to exert power and control as evidenced by the code compliance position he held with the Park City government. Several of his neighbors have gone on the record calling him a bureaucratic "bully." This type of behavior is consistent with a sadistic serial killer and should have been a red flag to investigators.
* He lived nearby some victims, even on the same street as one of them.

It will be interesting to know if Rader was on any of the lists of suspects that police had collected over the past 30 years and, if so, why did they not collect any DNA from him?

It would be very surprising if some other cold cases don't turn out to be BTK victims as well. To name a few that have been listed by Wichita residents on Internet bulletin boards

* "Nov. 12, 1974: Sherry Baker, a Wichita State University student
stabbed in her apartment. Hands tied behind back (with a coiled telephone cord)
No sign of forced entry.
* June 29, 1985: Linda Shawn Casey, a Wichita State University student
found dead on the bedroom floor of her home bound, beaten, sexually assaulted, tabbed repeatedly. No sign of forced entry. At the time, BTK was mentioned as a possibility but discounted due to the length of time since his last known victim.
* Nov, 12, 1999: Tina Frederick, lived a few blocks from BTK victim Shirley Vian.
Found shot to death in her apartment - lying on a bedroom floor."

Also, it's likely that there are even other BTK victims. Serial killers can't stop, they just become more imaginative about hiding their crimes.

District Attorney Nola Foulston said there is no statute of limitations on murder. However, the dealth penalty was not approved in Kansas until 1994. No death penalty applies to murder cases committed before 1994. In other words, the BTK case may not a capital case, unless they can tie him to new murders that occurred in 1994 or later.

Prosecutors will not be discussing the case publically after any charges are filed, Foulston said, to ensure that information released does not harm the trial.


Two new victims have been uncovered in the investigation, bringing the number of BTK victims from eight to ten.


The two victims most recently attributed to Rader have been identified as Marine Hedge, 53, and Delores "Dee" Davis, 62. The Wichita Eagle reported that Hedge was abducted from her home on Independence Street in Park City on April 27, 1985. She had been strangled by a pair of pantyhose and found eight days later on a rural dirt road near 143rd East and 37th North Street. The article stated that the case bore marked similarities to several other BTK murders in that, "the phone line at Hedge's home was cut" and her car had been driven from the crime scene to another location. Roxana Hegeman of The Associated Press claimed that Rader actually lived on the same street as Hedge.

Delores Davis, victim
Delores Davis, victim
Delores Davis was abducted from her home on January 19, 1991 and found 13 days later under a bridge on 117th Street North near Meridian, Kansas. Her hands and feet had been bound with the pantyhose that were used to strangle her. According to the Wichita Eagle, her murderer cut the phone line at her home and "then threw a brick through a glass door at the rear of her home to get inside." After disposing of Davis' body, the killer drove her car to another location and abandoned it. Davis' murder remained unsolved for more than a decade.


In 2004, there was a great deal of excitement when police arrested a man that the media believed was connected to the BTK case. At around 7:30 in the evening on December 1, 2004 after a day of heavy surveillance, police arrested a 64-year-old man at his south Wichita residence. It was initially reported that the arrest was made in connection with the BTK case and was prompted by a tip off from an unidentified caller into the BTK information hotline. However, investigators later denied that the man arrested was in any way linked to the murder investigation.

anyone 4.any.003 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Yet anyone who knew Jones was not altogether surprised. She could be inordinately aggressive, had betrayed many friends, and often resorted to lies to manipulate others. While she'd wanted children all her life, the two she had she'd left in the care of her adoptive mother.

Some believe that it was the accidental death of her fourteen-year-old brother that had worked on her when she was young; others that it was her adoptive father's death from cancer. It may have been that she was ungainly, unattractive, and desperately needy, and had learned how to get attention by lying. At any rate, she was reportedly voracious in her desire for the spotlight and for sexual liaisons, even if it cost her friends. She had married young and was immediately unfaithful.

Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire had reserved her special ardor for doctors, seeing them as mysterious and powerful. She wanted to get near them, so she eventually left her job as a beautician and trained for a year to become a vocational nurse. It looked like she would do very well, although she was not altogether happy about being on the bottom of the medical totem pole.

After only eight months after her first job, she was fired, in part because she made judgments in areas where she had no authority, and in part because she mistreated a patient, who subsequently complained. She didn't last long in her next job, but soon she was hired in the intensive care section of the pediatric unit of Bexar County Medical Center Hospital. It was here that she would leave her mark, and co-workers saw right away that Jones was unusual.

The first child she picked up had a fatal intestinal condition, and when he died shortly thereafter, she went berserk. She brought a stool into the cubicle where the body lay and sat staring at it.

It became clear to associates that Jones liked to feel needed and would often spend long hours on the ward, insisting it was important to a patient. However, she skipped classes on the proper handling of drugs and made several medication errors. While there were sufficient grounds for dismissal several times over, the head nurse protected her, which gave Jones a feeling of invincibility. She never liked to admit to any mistakes, and now she had someone in power to back her up. She tried to bully new nurses into looking to her for help.

anything 2.any.--2--2 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

n the Court of Common Pleas, a jury heard the opening statements on November 29, 1990, shortly after Thanksgiving. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire Christopher was dressed in a gray suit and black horn-rimmed glasses, looking, as the papers reported, "studious." He seemed a far cry from the demented killer thought to be running around in Frankford, raping and killing women over the past five years.

Assistant District Attorney Judith Rubino
Assistant District Attorney Judith Rubino
Assistant District Attorney Judith Rubino declared that Christopher was a vicious killer who used a "Rambo-style knife" to slash and kill Carol Dowd in the alley behind the fish market where he worked. She admitted she had no witnesses to the actual murder, but she had people who saw things on the street. These witnesses would provide sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove the defendant's guilt. Christopher was seen with Dowd in the alley, and a witness heard a woman scream. He was seen leaving the alley, and Dowd was found dead immediately afterward. He was seen with a knife, and his clothing had blood on it. In addition, he had lied about his whereabouts that night and had made other peculiar statements about the murder.

Defense attorney Jack McMahon told the jury that Christopher was known as a mild-mannered person, was well-liked and had no history of violence. He indicated that since the police were under pressure to solve the case, they might have rushed to judgment.

The prosecutor objected to this, and Judge George Ivins cautioned McMahon not to stray from the facts. McMahon continued with his argument, indicating that there were six cases prior to Dowd's murder that bore enough similarities to be judged the work of a serial killer, but the prosecutor again objected to this line of reasoning. Clearly McMahon was going to go for reasonable doubt by talking about the murder that had occurred while Christopher was in jail awaiting trial.

The judge ordered a sidebar, and the attorneys began to shout at each other, but McMahon was allowed to continue his line of reasoning: "Pressure sometimes presents unreliable results." McMahon said that the police had relied on evidence that, in stronger cases, would have been discarded, and that had been a mistake. The witnesses were prostitutes and junkies, with lengthy arrest records each and nine aliases between them. He could not imagine anyone urging the jury to believe them beyond a reasonable doubt. In fact, Leigh had admitted to lying twice to police about the incident, initially denying that she knew anything because she liked the defendant. But that made her an unreliable witness. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

When the police arrested Christopher, McMahon pointed out, there were no injuries on him, and no physical evidence linked him to the crime scene. No murder weapon was recovered, no so-called Rambo knife. There was no reason to view him as a murderer.

But it wasn't as simple as that.

Postmaster General Walker 5.pos.002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

[6] "Memorandum of a conversation", initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, August 6, 1941, S.D., II, 546-548.
[7] "Oral statement handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State on August 6, 1941", S.D., II, 548-549. See III, No. 1 for text as sent by Tokyo on August 5, 1941.

[2]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

structed Ambassador Nomura to enter into negotiations on an "off the record" basis, and to submit a proposal which was intended as a reply to the suggestion made by President Roosevelt on July 24, 1941. This would serve as a fresh basis for a Japanese-American understanding. Any agreements resulting from the negotiations would be then incorporated into the general formula for the adjustment of Japanese-American relations.

Japan believed that both countries realized it was more than ever necessary to examine calmly with mutual understanding the diverse viewpoints of the two nations. In order to remove the causes responsible for military, political, and economic friction between Japan and the United States, the Japanese government would agree not to station troops in the Southwest Pacific, except in French Indo-China, and to withdraw its army even from that area when the China Incident had reached a settlement.

In turn, America was to suspend its military measures in the Southwest Pacific area and was to advise Great Britain and the Netherlands to take similar steps. Japan also guaranteed the neutrality of the Philippine Islands, provided that discriminatory measures would not be taken against Japanese subjects by either the United States or any other nation. By close cooperation between Japan and the United States in the production and procurement of such natural resources as might be required by either country, normal trade relations were to be restored.[8]

Although Ambassador Nomura wished to discuss the contents of the Japanese proposal immediately, Secretary Hull pocketed the copy given him, and suggested that any discussion of it be postponed pending his study of the document. Admitting to the Japanese Ambassador that he was pessimistic regarding the value of the proposal which had been mentioned in the Japanese representative's oral statement, Secretary Hull referred to the arduous but unsuccessful efforts made by both men to improve relations between the United States and Japan.

Pointing to the continuous agitation in the government-controlled Japanese press and to statements of high officials advocating a policy of force and conquest, Secretary Hull drew a parallel between the Japanese contention that theirs was strictly a campaign of precautionary aggression, and German insistence that its action in Europe and its war against Russia was a matter of self-defense. In view of the Japanese belief that the United States was endeavoring to encircle Japan, Secretary Hull felt that future conversations would be valueless. The meeting was then concluded on a defeatist note.[9]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[10]

Ambassador Nomura reported that on the evening of August 6, 1941 he called on Secretary Hull to carry out the instructions received from Tokyo on August 5, 1941. Having made a detailed explanation of Japan's intentions, he then submitted Japan's proposal in English to the Secretary of State.[11] Secretary Hull promised to study the proposal carefully, but, according to Ambassador Nomura, he had not seemed to take much interest in it, and had begun to express his opinions on current Japanese-American relations without further mention of the proposal. Ambassador Nomura summarized the Secretary Hull's statement as follows:

Setting aside the relations between him and me, he said he was greatly disappointed in the actions Japan has been taking one after another, and that so long as Japan does not give up the policy of force, there was no use talking.

So long as the Japanese Government authorities say that what the United States is doing is encirclement of Japan, he could not expect anything of Japan ("I can expect nothing from you"). When we wish to live in peace and security, HITLER, saying that he was acting in self-defense, mows down everything that stands in his way.[12]

[8] "Proposal by the Japanese Government Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State," August 6, 1941, S.D., II 549-550. See II, No. 2 for text as sent by Tokyo on August 5, 1941.
[9] S.D. II, 546-548.
[10] III, 6-7.
[11] II, 3-5,6.
[12] III, 6-7.

[3]

Ambassador Nomura came away from this interview convinced that no matter what explanation was offered, it could not convey Japan's intentions to the leaders of the United States. Moreover, he felt that the United States was determined to deal with any situation.[13]

3. Tokyo Requests an Immediate Report from Ambassador Nomura

On August 6, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda complained to Ambassador Nomura that he had not yet received a report concerning the action he had requested the Japanese Ambassador to take on July 23, 1941.[14] Unfortunately, the message indicating the action to be taken was garbled either in transmission or interception, and American cryptanalysts were unable to discover the nature of the request.[15] In view of his previous dilatoriness, Ambassador Nomura was ordered to report immediately the results of his interview with Secretary Hull on August 6, 1941 concerning the New Japanese proposal.[16]

As a result of this reprimand, Ambassador Nomura replied that he had sent several reports relating to discussions between Minister Wakasugi and Messrs. Welles and Hamilton which had indicated that the American authorities saw no course but to end the conversations.[17] Ambassador Nomura also reported that the publisher of the Army-Navy Journal, had called upon him to state that the American people, including even the middle west isolationists, supported the administration's policies toward Japan. According to Ambassador Nomura, he was deeply concerned that only a few Americans of influence were sympathetic toward Japan.[18]

4. Japan Again Proposes a Konoye-Roosevelt Conference (August 7, 1941)

Japanese-American relations were so critical that on August 7, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda informed Ambassador Nomura that a policy of "laissez faire" should no longer be pursued. He suggested, therefore, that a conference be held as soon as possible between Prime Minister Konoye and President Roosevelt. Though the subjects to be considered would depend greatly on the time at which the conference was held, in general the discussion would be conducted along the lines of the present negotiations.

To save time, the conference would last no longer than a few days, and it was hoped that the delegation would be restricted to a minimum number of persons. Strict secrecy was to be observed until the calling of the conference was definitely agreed upon, at which time a public announcement could be made, if President Roosevelt had no objection. The Japanese Foreign Minister informed Ambassador Nomura that, to ensure secrecy, the American Ambassador in Tokyo was not being advised of this new proposal.[19]

If there were any truth in the rumors concerning the resignation of Secretary Hull and the imminence of a general embargo on all shipments of petroleum products to Japan, Foreign Minister Toyoda informed Ambassador Nomura, it would hardly be worthwhile for Japan to propose this conference. Therefore, Ambassador Nomura was requested to investigate immediately and report his findings to Tokyo.[20]

5. Ambassador Nomura Reports on Current American Policy Toward Japan

At approximately the same time that Foreign Minister Toyoda was reprimanding Ambassador Nomura for his failure in making prompt replies to his specific questions, Ambassador Nomura

[13] II, 7.
[14] III, 8.
[15] III, 9.
[16] III, 8. [17] III, 10.
[18] II, 11.
[19] III, 12.
[20] III, 13.

[4]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

submitted a report to Tokyo concerning recent modifications in the policy of the United States toward Japan.[21] Although agreeing that Japanese-American relations had reached an extremely critical stage, Ambassador Nomura commented that such a condition was the inevitable result of Japan's Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire own action in following other essential policies.

Remarking that the United States believed the Axis nations to be working hand in hand to conquer the world, Ambassador Nomura reported that his insistence in explaining that Japan was guided solely by the principles of the brotherhood of mankind had led to the beginning of unofficial discussions with the Secretary of State. However, the occupation of French Indo-China by Japan had put an end to those same discussions and, according to recent conversations with Secretary Hull and Acting Secretary Welles, the United States had returned to its original position with regard to Japan. Secretary Hull had been bitterly disappointed because he had been very interested in bettering relations between Japan and the United States, Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire and both he and his very good friend, Postmaster General Walker, had been very much embarrassed by the turn of events.

Although American authorities claimed that the policy of the United States toward Japan was not one of unfriendliness, since it was taking measures only to counteract certain steps taken by Japan, Ambassador Nomura pointed to the freezing order and the export embargo issued by the United States, and the joint warning by Secretary Hull and Foreign Minister Eden with regard to Thailand as indications that there was no doubt that the United States was prepared to take drastic action against Japan. Furthermore, in view of the friendly relations between the United States and Russia, Ambassador Nomura doubted that the United States would remain on the sidelines if Japan attacked to the north. Reports of a conference between high British and American military and naval authorities on aid to Russia and the Far Eastern question had attracted Japanese attention.[22]

Ambassador Nomura reminded Tokyo that its Axis partner, Germany, was exercising the utmost precautions in dealing with the United States and had even gone so far as to issue peace terms in an attempt to influence American public opinion. He also pointed out that the trend which was influencing the United States to center its attention on relations with the Japanese would increase in the near future. Ambassador Nomura concluded as follows: I have submitted my humble opinions before and they are unchanged today. Our country is at present standing at a most critical crossroads. My only desire is that we choose the right road, for the sake of the future of our country.[23]

6. Hull-Nomura Conversation (August 8, 1941)

(a) State Department Report[24]

At a meeting requested by the Secretary of State, Ambassador Nomura was presented with a reply to the August 6, 1941 proposal of the Japanese government. According to this American document, President Roosevelt had proposed that if the Japanese government would withdraw its forces from French Indo-China, and would refrain from the establishment of bases there by means of its military and naval strength, the government of the United States would guarantee for itself, and would also attempt to obtain from China, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, a binding commitment to regard French Indo-China as a neutral country similar to Switzerland.[25] Not only would these governments forego any military act of aggression against

[21] III, 14.
[22] III, 14-15.
[23] III, 14.
[24] "Memorandum of a Conversation", initialled by Mr. J. W. Ballantine, August 8, 1941, S.D., II, 550-551.
[25] "Document handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)", August 8, 1941, S.D., II, 552-553. The English text of this document was sent in Japanese code to Tokyo on August 8, 1941. See III, 16-18.

[5]

French Indo-China, but they would also permit local French authorities to remain undisturbed in the administration of their territory. This proposal, in its entirety, had been subsequently extended to include Thailand.

In view of Japan's thorough acquaintance with America's many attempts to found a broad understanding, calculated to establish and maintain a peace in the Pacific which would be beneficial to all the countries concerned, the United States felt that the Japanese proposals of August 6, 1941 were lacking in responsiveness.[26]

After reading the reply of the United States to gain its import, the Japanese representative re-asserted his country's desire to adjust relations with the United States. As a means of attaining this end, he suggested a conference in Honolulu between the heads of the two governments. Mr. Hull replied that if the conversations between the officials of Japan and the United States had produced a basis for mutual understanding, they would now be able to go forward along a policy of peace. However, the loss of control by the peaceful faction in the Japanese government had proven too formidable an obstacle, and Secretary Hull had been forced to notify the Japanese Ambassador that the measures taken by his government had removed the basis for the "understanding" which they had been discussing.

According to Secretary Hull, the Japanese press was being constantly stimulated to stress the alleged encirclement of Japan by the United States. Ambassador Nomura replied that the Japanese press was being inspired only to invigorate his people and it was not attempting to counteract the efforts of the government to improve relations with the United States.

When asked by Ambassador Nomura if this constituted an answer to his suggestion that the heads of the two governments should meet, Secretary Hull replied that the responsibility for shaping suitable policies of peace now rested with the Japanese government.[27]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[28]

Ambassador Nomura informed Tokyo that he had received from the Secretary of State a reply to the proposal he had submitted on August 6, 1941. According to Ambassador Nomura, the document indicated that the United States had not compromised in the least beyond what President Roosevelt had said previously.

To Ambassador Nomura's proposal that the leaders of the two countries meet for a conference in Hawaii, Secretary Hull replied that the United States had been making preparations for that purpose since Japan had agreed to participate in such a conference. Secretary Hull pointed out, however, that since his talks with Ambassador Nomura had demonstrated that the two countries were in conflict and that Japan's policy had not been altered, there was no point in holding such conferences. Mr. Ballantine agreed with this statement and declared that the use of force could not go hand in hand with the maintenance of the peace in the Pacific.

Both Secretary Hull and Mr. Welles commented on Japan's constant prating about an encirclement policy, but Ambassador Nomura replied that though the United States was absolutely safe from the viewpoint of defense, it continued to claim that many dangers were surrounding it in order to have an excuse for expanding its national defense.

Ambassador Nomura was convinced that American authorities would negotiate with Japan only if it stopped further military operations. Believing, in view of this, that there was not the slightest chance of a parley with Japanese officials, Ambassador Nomura suggested that the Japanese Foreign Office have Ambassador Grew in Tokyo stop his activities to bring about the conference of leaders.[29]

[26] S.D., II 552-553. See III, 17-18.
[27] S.D., II, 550-551.
[28] III, 19-20.
[29] Ibid.

[6]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

7. Foreign Minister Toyoda Again Urges a Roosevelt-Konoye Conference

On August 9, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda emphasized to Ambassador Nomura the importance of having the proposal for a meeting between the leaders of the two nations submitted to President Roosevelt immediately. The Japanese Ambassador was directed to explain to the American President the advantages that would be derived therefrom.[30]

Ambassador Nomura promptly replied that he would call on President Roosevelt as soon as the latter had returned to Washington, and that he would do everything in his power to make a favorable impression. However, the Japanese Ambassador was convinced that as long as Japan proceeded along the lines of its present policy, the United States would not deviate from its established course. After warning Tokyo that the United States considered Japan's occupation of French Indo-China as a definite indication of an aggression policy, Ambassador Nomura declared that both President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull were in complete agreement, and that it would be a mistake to try to differentiate between their attitudes.

In view of the firm stand expressed by the United States on August 6 and August 8, 1941, Ambassador Nomura felt that even the offer of Prime Minister Konoye to come to the United States would not move American authorities to any perceptible degree. Remarking that he did not expect too much from the interview he planned to have with President Roosevelt, Ambassador Nomura expressed his pessimism concerning the present critical state of affairs. He stressed the need for evolving some plan which would persuade the United States to change its policy toward Japan.[31]

Three days later Foreign Minister Toyoda sent another urgent message explaining that though the Americans apparently considered the Japanese proposals made in reply to President Roosevelt's suggestions to be Japan's final answer, this was not necessarily the impression which Japan intended to convey. Prime Minister Konoye was willing to confer further with the President of the United States along general lines with a view to maintaining world peace.[32]

8. Colonel Iwakura and Mr. Ikawa Are Recalled to Japan

Ambassador Nomura notified Tokyo on August 9, 1941 that Colonel Hideo Iwakura and Mr. Ikawa had returned to Japan aboard the Tatsuta Maru. Expressing his appreciation for the complete cooperation and great help he had received from these officials, Ambassador Nomura asked that certain Japanese authorities be informed of their excellent work.[33]

It will be recalled that Ambassador Nomura had been severely reprimanded by Foreign Minister Matsuoka, when the latter was in office, for having used the term "associates" in describing the status of these assistants.

9. Counselor Iguchi Suggests a Propaganda Campaign in Japan

Counselor Sadao Iguchi of the Japanese Embassy in Washington submitted a report to Secretary Tasiro in Tokyo on August 11, 1941, in which he emphasized the firm attitude of the United States toward Japan, and stressed his belief that the United States would resort to war, if necessary.[34]

Indicating his realization that the Japanese government was fully cognizant of the dangerous situation, Counselor Iguchi commented, however, on the general unawareness of the Japanese public concerning the firm stand being taken by the United States toward Japan. He believed that the Japanese people were guilty of wishful thinking in regard to the United States, and, if the worst came, they would be taken completely by surprise.

[30] III, 21-22.
[31] III, 23-24.
[32] III, 25.
[33] III, 26.
[34] III, 27.

[7]

In view of this, he suggested that the Intelligence Section of the Cabinet or some other group should start a campaign to enlighten the Japanese people concerning the real attitude of the United States, so that they could be prepared for any eventuality. He suggested that the reports, concerning European and American intelligence, issued by the Intelligence Section of the Foreign Office, should contain more concrete information.[35]

10. Prime Minister Toyoda Reprimands Minister Wakasugi

On August 12, 1941, Foreign Minister Toyoda ordered Minister Wakasugi, who was in Los Angeles, to make no further public comments on the Japanese-American question until he had reported to the Foreign Office in Japan. This reprimand was occasioned by an interview which Minister Wakasugi had given over the international telephone to the Japanese press. The newspaper report had heightened the critical nature of the Japanese-American question because of its effect upon various Japanese groups. Mr. Wakasugi was also directed not to give the impression that he was bearing any important proposals from the United States.[36]

Mr. Wakasugi immediately expressed his amazement that his interview could have made difficult the position of his government in regard to the delicate Japanese-American relations, since he had no other motive than the desire to make a frank and fitting statement. In addition, he had no intention of implying any lessening of America's responsibility in the matter.[37]

11. Ambassador Nomura Confers with an American Cabinet Member (August 13, 1941)

On August 13, 1941 Ambassador Nomura conferred with an American Cabinet member whose name was not given in the Japanese Ambassador's report to Tokyo, but who may be presumed to have been Postmaster Frank C. Walker, known to be working behind the scenes with Secretary Hull to effect a peaceful solution to Japanese-American difficulties. Though expressing his conviction that the Japanese occupation of French Indo-China had been assisted by Germany's pressure on the French government, the Cabinet member said that he agreed with President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull with regard to the desirability of maintaining peace in the Pacific.[38]

Ambassador Nomura believed that Japan could not remove its troops from French Indo-China at present, but that when a favorable opportunity arose, they would be evacuated. When he mentioned a conference of the leading men of Japan and the United States as a means of surmounting the present crisis, even though a completely satisfactory solution might not be achieved, the American official did not show much enthusiasm, but promised to discuss the matter with Secretary Hull.

Declaring that the American press was paying more attention to Japan than to Germany, Ambassador Nomura referred to newspaper stories suggesting that the United States Navy concentrate all of its forces in the Pacific, and that Britain and the United States pool their navies to ensure having the necessary power in that area. Several writers had commented that Congress would more likely agree to war against Japan than against Germany.[39]

Stating that he would not deny the statements, the American Cabinet member remarked that Japan's excellent navy would be exceedingly troublesome if combined with that of Germany. Although the United States foresaw future trouble with Russia, it worked jointly with the Soviet Union in order to destroy Hitlerism.

[35] III, Ibid.
[36] III, 28.
[37] III, 29.
[38] III, 30.
[39] Ibid.

[8]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Ambassador Nomura remarked that pressure against Japan was exceedingly harmful. If the Japanese people were to adjust themselves and act in accordance with the policy desired by the United States, then their problems must be handled from an entirely different viewpoint.[40]

12. Hull-Nomura Conversation (August 13, 1941)

(a) Secretary Hull's Report[41]

Secretary Hull requested that the Japanese Ambassador call on him on August 13, 1941 to receive a statement citing mistreatment of Americans and injury to American rights in places under Japanese jurisdiction.[42] After the Japanese Ambassador had read the document, Secretary Hull said that he could not understand Japan's purpose in allowing these injustices to continue, and, therefore, had felt that a summarization of the incidents should be presented to the government of Japan.

According to Secretary Hull, the Japanese Ambassador agreed wholeheartedly with his views and said that he would be glad to take the matter up with his government. Secretary Hull then informed Ambassador Nomura that he might have other material to present to the Japanese government by Saturday, August 16, 1941, or Sunday, and in answer to a question concerning his availability, the Japanese Ambassador stated that he would be in Washington at that time.

Secretary Hull then introduced a question relating to the alleged promise of Japan not to bomb Chungking after the U.S.S. Tutuila incident.[43] Recounting how the Japanese Ambassador had called on Mr. Welles on July 31, 1941 to express officially to President Roosevelt Japan's deep regret over the bombing of the U.S.S. Tutuila at Chungking, Secretary Hull reminded Ambassador Nomura that he had assured the United States that the bombing had been an accident. In order to prevent similar incidents, Japan had promised to suspend all bombing operations over the city area of Chungking. Japan had requested that this suspension of bombing operations be regarded as strictly confidential and had offered to pay full indemnity for any damage to American properties. At that time, the Japanese Ambassador had informed Mr. Welles that he himself had recommended this procedure to his government.[44]

In view of this action, the American government had considered the incident closed, but on August 8, 10 and 12, 1941 three dispatches had given accounts of new bombings by Japanese planes at Chungking. A telegram dated August 11, 1941, from the American Embassy at Chungking reported that, during the past four days, Chungking had been subjected to unusually heavy and prolonged air raids. Not only had districts outside the city been bombed, but the city area also had been affected, though no bombs had been dropped in the area directly opposite the anchorage of the American gunboat and the United States Chancery. At least one American residence had been demolished, and other residences within the city area had been damaged. In view of these occurrences, the United States requested an explanation and an indication of Japan's attitude and intentions regarding its pledge of July 31, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador promptly replied that Japan had promised only to cease bombing the city area temporarily and not indefinitely. Although believing that Mr. Welles had understood this stipulation, Ambassador Nomura stated that he might have failed in his efforts to inform the Under Secretary. Nevertheless, he reiterated that this was Japan's position.[45]

[40] Ibid.
[41] "Memorandum by the Secretary of State", August 13, 1941, S.D., I, 907-908.
[42] "The Department of State to the Japanese Embassy", S.D., I, 908-910; III, 31
[43] "Memorandum by the Secretary of State", August 13, 1941, S.D., I, 907-908.
[44] "The Department of State to the Japanese Embassy", August 12, 1941, S.D., I, 723-724.
[45] S.D., I, 908.

[9]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[46]

Ambassador Nomura stated that at four o'clock in the afternoon of August 13, 1941 he had called on the Secretary of State, who had handed him the note mentioned above. Secretary Hull had remarked that he had no intention of releasing the note for publication since it would aggravate unduly public opinion. Though there were only a few hundred United States' citizens in Japan, there were a hundred odd-thousand Japanese in America.

Ambassador Nomura replied that Japan was taking action to parallel the freezing order of the United States, and was also enacting measures against individuals, similar to those in operation against the Japanese in the United States. However, he felt that such pin-prickings were annoyances which did not affect the general situation; therefore, he hoped that they could be mutually discontinued.

Ambassador Nomura declared that when Secretary Hull had introduced the subject of the Chungking bombings, he had explained that Japan had promised to cease bombing the Chungking suburban areas but only for a certain period. Ambassador Nomura also commented that Secretary Hull's inquiry concerning his presence in Washington during the latter part of the week indicated that he was planning to issue some sort of a statement.[47]

13. Japan Discounts the Attempted Assassination of Vice Premier Hiranuma

Japan's eagerness to have Prime Minister Konoye confer with President Roosevelt was evident in a dispatch from Tokyo on August 15, 1941, which denied the erroneous conclusion of some who had interpreted the attempted assassination of Baron Hiranuma, Vice Premier of Tokyo and Minister without Portfolio, as a reaction of Japanese extremists against any cooperation with Britain and the United States.[48]

According to newspaper reports, rumors from diplomatic quarters indicated that an Axis press man had inquired about the Hiranuma shooting some ten hours before it occurred.[49] Emphasizing that his government's attitude was unshaken despite this unfortunate incident, Foreign Minister Toyoda declared that Japanese public opinion would approve any fair revision of national relations regardless of the other party concerned.

Though he was cognizant of Ambassador Nomura's recent messages concerning the obstacles to further Japanese-American negotiations, Foreign Minister Toyoda again urged that the Japanese Ambassador see President Roosevelt in order to expedite the settlement of broad issues and to prevent a general calamity. The American Ambassador in Tokyo would be advised of Japan's proposal at the first opportune moment.[50]

14. Hull-Nomura Conversation (August 16, 1941)

(a) Secretary Hull's Report[51]

Calling on Secretary Hull in regard to President Roosevelt's proposal of August 8, 1941 Ambassador Nomura expressed once more his country's desire to ensure peaceful relations with the United States, and stated that since Japan would make concessions to avoid war, there was a basis for further progress along this line. The Japanese Ambassador also reiterated his suggestion that high Japanese and American officials meet halfway between the two countries for a conference.

[46] III, 32.
[47] Ibid.
[48] III, 33.
[49] New York Times, August 15, 1941, p. 10:2.
[50] III, 33.
[51] "Memorandum by the Secretary of State", August 16, 1941, S.D., II, 553-554.

[10]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

However, when Ambassador Nomura asked whether his conversations with Secretary Hull would be resumed on their former basis, Mr. Hull repeated the circumstances leading up to the cessation of their conversations, but did not pass further on the question or respond favorably. In pointing out that the establishment of bases in and about French Indo-China by the Japanese army, navy, and air forces indicated Japan's intention to effect a serious invasion of the South Seas areas, which would menace British success in Europe and eventually the safety of the Western Hemisphere, Secretary Hull emphasized the fact that the United States could not remain silent in the face of such a threat. To Ambassador Nomura's assertion that Japan desired merely to secure necessary commodities, Mr. Hull replied that under a peaceful agreement Japan would have obtained access to world markets.

Since Ambassador Nomura repeatedly stressed the desire of Japan for an amicable settlement of differences and its willingness to make concessions in order to have the conversations resumed, Secretary Hull expressed some interest in this, but pointed to Japan's continuing policy of conquest by force and to the bitter attacks on the United States by the Japanese government-controlled press. Secretary Hull also suggested that the Japanese Ambassador talk to President Roosevelt and to any other American officials concerning this subject. However, Ambassador Nomura stated that until he had received specific instructions from his own country concerning the concessions it might be willing to make, he could not take such action.[52]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[53]

From the intelligence reports which Ambassador Nomura received concerning the recent conference between the leaders of Great Britain and the United States, it appeared that England desired to draw the United States into war with the purpose of utilizing its resources in the Far East. On the other hand, the United States wished to check Great Britain's ambitions by having it clarify its war aims.

From the joint statement published subsequent to this conference, it was evident, according to the Japanese Ambassador, that the United States had achieved its purpose and that Great Britain had been forced to assume a comparatively disadvantageous position. In view of this report, Ambassador Nomura had considered it essential to confer with Secretary Hull prior to President Roosevelt's return to Washington. Therefore, on the afternoon of August 16, 1941 Ambassador Nomura had met with the American Secretary of State and had discussed the current situation.

After relaying the instructions which the Japanese government had sent him, Ambassador Nomura stressed the necessity for renewing relations between the two countries, since if the present situation remained unchecked, the outcome would be disastrous. Ambassador Nomura pointed out that a Pacific war would be "mass murder to an unprecedented extent in the history of the world." Such a war would not be terminated quickly because of any difference in the financial status of Japan and the United States, but instead would develop into a war of complete exhaustion, lasting several years, and would be advantageous to neither country. Therefore, not only should Japan and the United States guard against the extremists in both governments, but they must also be on the lookout against enticing offers made by third countries to both Japan and the United States. Secretary Hull remarked that it had been rumored that Chancellor Hitler had begun the war knowing Commissar Stalin's attitude well in advance.

At this point Ambassador Nomura strongly refuted the charges that Japan was under military domination by insisting that the characteristics of its imperial family, its government and its people were opposed to militarization. Although Japan advocated a Far Eastern Sphere of Co-prosperity, such a policy was not to be confused with military conquest, since it meant living together by cooperative defense, and, thus, did not differ greatly from the Good Neighbor Policy of the United States.

[52] Ibid.
[53] III, 34.

[11]

After considering Ambassador Nomura's remark, Secretary Hull stated that the United States recognized the equal status of all countries without the necessity of resorting to the use of arms. Ambassador Nomura replied that external pressure upon Japan had caused it to retaliate, but if this outside pressure were removed, Japan would resort to peaceful measures. Secretary Hull seemed to agree with this statement.

Ambassador Nomura then turned the conversation to the proposed meeting between the leaders of both countries. It was his personal opinion that this meeting should be encouraged rather than discouraged, since many of the measures contained in the Atlantic Charter coincided directly with the statement issued by Prince Konoye, and through both of these documents, an agreement could be reached between the two countries. Indicating that Japan's only reason for suggesting a conference with the United States was to improve the present diplomatic situation, the Japanese Ambassador asked if the United States still deemed such a conference impossible.

Although he had not yet taken up the matter with anyone outside of his own office, Secretary Hull promised to confer with President Roosevelt at the earliest opportunity. According to Ambassador Nomura, this attitude was much different from Secretary Hull's earlier position and was probably the result of his having talked with the Cabinet members who had conferred with the Japanese Ambassador. When Secretary Hull inquired concerning Ambassador Nomura's personal opinion on the general outlook, the Japanese Ambassador replied that it would be extremely dangerous to let Japanese-American relations remain in their present condition.[54]

15. Ambassador Nomura Summarizes the Japanese-American Diplomatic Situation (August 16, 1941)

In summarizing the Japanese-American diplomatic situation on August 16, 1941, Ambassador Nomura warned that anything might happen at any moment. As soon as Japan made another move, particularly if it were directed against Thailand, matters would grow suddenly worse. Though he had reported that America was not united in regard to participation in the European war and that President Roosevelt himself was hesitant, the Japanese Ambassador emphasized that the American people were unanimous in regard to taking a strong hand in the Far East. This would meet with the approval of Great Britain, China and Germany.[55]

Expressing his belief that President Roosevelt would not go to extremes inasmuch as both he and American naval authorities were conscious of the tremendous tasks involved in a Pacific war, Ambassador Nomura stated that the British believed that if a Japanese-American war were started, there would be a good prospect of getting the United States to participate in the European war.

The Japanese Ambassador pointed out that Allied confidence in ultimate victory was gaining, for even if Germany eventually defeated Russia, the war would not have been short and decisive, since it had already reached the stage of attrition. Furthermore, since submarine war in the Atlantic was being won by Britain and the United States, the situation closely resembled that of 1917.[56] Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

With such a state of affairs in the United States, Ambassador Nomura had been very anxious to have the State Department approve Foreign Minister Toyoda's proposal for a conference of Prime Minister Konoye and President Roosevelt, but Secretary Hull had rejected it. Ambassador Nomura's efforts to interest a Cabinet member who was intimately associated with Secretary Hull failed. President Roosevelt at one time had thought of arranging a similar conference, but Japan's occupation of French Indo-China had led him to believe that Japan did

[54] Ibid.
[55] III, 35.
[56] III, 36.

[12]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

not desire a fundamental readjustment of Japanese-American relations, but was only conducting a policy of appeasement towards the United States.

Ambassador Nomura reported that American authorities were beginning to think that he had been misled by his own country.[57]

Since Japanese newspapers had severely criticized a statement recently issued by the American government, the atmosphere had become worse. Ambassador Nomura advised that unless something were done immediately to eliminate this misunderstanding, he would not be able to accomplish his objective. Furthermore, since President Roosevelt was unfavorable to the proposal, Ambassador Nomura did not expect him to do anything about it.

Indicating three critical points concerning which the United States wished Japan to give some sort of a pledge, namely, the question of self-defense, the withdrawal of troops from China, and non-discrimination in trade, Ambassador Nomura requested that the Japanese Foreign Office consider them and send him any further instructions at once. Thus, he would be prepared for an interview with President Roosevelt who was returning to Washington within a few days.[58]

16. Roosevelt-Nomura Conversation (August 17, 1941)

(a) Secretary Hull's Report[59]

In an informal conference between President Roosevelt and the Japanese Ambassador, called at Mr. Roosevelt's request, the strained relations between the two countries were discussed. After President Roosevelt had contrasted the policies and principles of the American government with Japan's course of conquest by force, and had asserted that the next move toward peace now depended upon Japan, Ambassador Nomura produced an instruction which he said was from his government. It emphasized Japan's hopes for a mutual understanding, and expressed Prince Konoye's willingness to attend a conference with President Roosevelt at some point halfway between Japan and the United States.

President Roosevelt then commented that since the relations between the two governments should be brought up-to-date, he had prepared an oral statement clarifying the position of the United States. He regretted the necessity for having to do so, but there was no other recourse. President Roosevelt read the oral statement to the Japanese Ambassador and then handed him the document containing it.[60]

In his oral statement President Roosevelt indicated that in protracted conversations during the past months Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura had attempted to formulate a mutual understanding, based on the preclusion of force by either country, in order to maintain peace and justice in the Pacific. On July 24, 1941 President Roosevelt had offered to urge the governments of China, Great Britain, and the Netherlands to join the United States in a solemn declaration that they had no aggressive intentions with regard to Indo-China and would make all markets and materials of Indo-China available to all nations on equal terms, provided that Japan withdrew its forces from this area.

In spite of these efforts, the Japanese government had continued its military activities throughout the Far East and had occupied Indo-China. Although the American government was in full sympathy with Japanese desires for amicable and mutually profitable relations with the United States, it was now deemed necessary to warn Japan that a continuation of its program of military domination of neighboring countries by force or threat of force, would com-

[57] III, 37.
[58] III, 38.
[59] "Memorandum by the Secretary of State", August 17, 1941, S.D., II, 554-555.
[60] Ibid.

[13]

pel the United States to take any and all steps deemed necessary to ensure the legitimate rights and interests, the safety and the security of the United States and its citizens.[61]

After a slight pause, President Roosevelt turned to a discussion of Ambassador Nomura's request for a resumption of the conversations with Secretary Hull. Making further reference to Japan's policy of conquest by force, and to the bitter denunciation of America by the Japanese government-controlled press, President Roosevelt pointed out that under such conditions the reopening of conversations would be fruitless. President Roosevelt then read another document to Ambassador Nomura, which he afterwards handed to him.

In this second statement, President Roosevelt declared in regard to the suggestion of the Japanese Ambassador that responsible officials of Japan and the United States meet to discuss the adjustment of present relations, and with reference to Ambassador Nomura's desire that the previous informal conversations be resumed, that the Secretary of State had already advised Ambassador Nomura that the United States could not see how the conversations could be pursued if Japan continued its present policy of force and supported the bitter press attacks against America.[62]

On two occasions, officers from the Department of State had expressed concern over the impending Japanese offensive in French Indo-China. Subsequently, on July 21 and July 23, 1941, the Acting Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, had informed Ambassador Nomura that the United States believed Japan to be embarking on a program of conquest in the South Pacific area, and since the position of the American government had already been clearly defined, there could be no basis for further conversations.

President Roosevelt pointed out that in order to achieve a peaceful settlement of the entire Pacific situation, a progressive program would have to be evolved from the basic principle of equal commercial opportunity and treatment for all nations. With the cooperation of the countries concerned in this area, all available resources of capital, technical skill, and economic leadership would be utilized not only for building up their own economies, but also for developing regions where productive capacity could be improved which would increase the purchasing power of the nations and peoples concerned, would raise standards of living, and would create conditions conducive to the maintenance of peace. However, any disruption of the peace would find the United States continuing its policy of sending immediate aid to the areas within the Pacific which were resisting aggression.

Since this program would prevent any country from extending its military, political or economic control over other peoples, the United States felt that it assured to Japan satisfaction of its economic needs and legitimate aspirations. If the Japanese government would agree to suspend its expansionist activities and readjust its position along peaceful lines, the American government was prepared to consider resumption of the informal exploratory discussions which had been interrupted in July. However, to clarify the situation for both governments, it would be advantageous if the Japanese government furnished a clearer statement than had yet been presented concerning its present attitude and plans.[63]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[64]

Ambassador Nomura reported to Foreign Minister Toyoda on August 18, 1941 that at half-past four in the afternoon of August 18, 1941[65] he had had a secret interview with President Roosevelt in the presence of Secretary Hull.

[61] "Oral statement handed by President Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)", August 17, 1941, S.D., II, 556-557. See III, 39 for English text sent in a Japanese cipher to Tokyo on August 17, 1941.
[62] "Statement handed by President Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)", August 17, 1941, S.D., II, 557-559. See III, 39 for English text sent in a Japanese cipher to Tokyo on August 17, 1941.
[63] Ibid.
[64] III, 41-47.
[65] This should be August 17, 1941. See III, 40.

[14]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

President Roosevelt opened his remarks by saying that he had just spent a few days enjoying life at sea, during which he had sailed on his yacht and afterwards transferred to a warship to keep a rendezvous at a point off the Maine coast. Then he began to discuss the current problems, reading from two papers which stated that the United States would immediately take any steps necessary for the protection of its interests and citizens, if Japan were to make further use of force. Furthermore, before Japan's proposal for a meeting of both country's leaders could be realized, the United States must be advised of the aims of the Japanese government. Upon finishing his remarks, President Roosevelt asked that Ambassador Nomura relay the contents of both messages to Japan with the understanding that the documents were not to be considered as oral statements but only as reference material. Ambassador Nomura then accepted the papers on the condition that they would be used solely for his own information.[66]

In the course of the conversation President Roosevelt stated that Secretary Hull, Ambassador Nomura and himself were striving to bring about peace in the Pacific, but no one else was. When Ambassador Nomura remarked that there were many other nations desiring war in the Pacific, President Roosevelt affirmed this and said that the United States, Britain, and probably Russia hoped for peace in the Pacific, but there were not many other nations which desired it.[67]

After joking about "our German friend" who maintained no warships in the Pacific, President Roosevelt stated that because none of the three men present had come up through the diplomatic ranks, they did not feel bound by diplomatic conventions. Therefore, the notes that he held in his hand were not diplomatic documents nor aide-memoires, but were merely expressions of what he wanted to say. The Japanese Ambassador remarked that though President Roosevelt had stated that he had no desire to commit these items to paper, yet the President seemed to feel that they needed to be expressed in writing.[68]

Informing President Roosevelt that the Japanese government was sincere in its desire to adjust Japanese-American diplomatic relations, Ambassador Nomura stated that the Japanese government would like to be advised concerning the possibility of arranging an interview with Prince Konoye, as well as the possibility of the continuation in the near future of the informal conversations which had been carried on during the past months.

Since the Japanese government had already expressed its opinion regarding the French Indo-Chinese question to the American Secretary of State, it felt that no clarifying explanations were necessary. Yet Prime Minister Konoye was still willing to exchange opinions with a view toward achieving world peace.

Asserting his country's confidence in the statesmanship of President Roosevelt and in his ability to settle things, Ambassador Nomura stated that Japan would reciprocate in the fine type of statesmanship the United States would undoubtedly exercise. After listening closely to Ambassador Nomura's summarization of the existing situation, President Roosevelt turned the conversation to the problem of finding a suitable location for the proposed conference. President Roosevelt stated that "Geographically speaking, it is impossible for me to go to Honolulu. I am not permitted to travel in an airplane."[69] He suggested instead that the Japanese Prime Minister meet with him at Juneau, Alaska, as an alternate to either San Francisco or Seattle, Washington. To President Roosevelt's inquiry as to the number of days it would take Prince Konoye to reach the suggested locations, Ambassador Nomura answered that it would take about ten days and that the climate would be favorable until about the middle of September.

[66] III, 40.
[67] III, 41.
[68] III, 42.
[69] III, 43.

[15]

President Roosevelt next pointed out certain revisions that had been made in the documents he held. He had crossed out the word "President" since the original text implied that President Roosevelt himself would attend the conference, and for geographic reasons this might not be possible. Furthermore, he added that while the United States did not welcome the "closed door" policy, which it had been forced to adopt because of Japanese actions, it remained firm in its statement that Japan itself must open the door in the present circumstances. At this point President Roosevelt turned to a discussion of French Indo-China.[70]

Throughout the entire conference Ambassador Nomura was favorably impressed with President Roosevelt's tactful attitude and his high spirits. The Japanese Ambassador believed that President Roosevelt was exceptionally pleased with the responsiveness of the British people to the joint British-American peace terms arrived at in collaboration with Prime Minister Churchill. Unlike the Fourteen Articles issued independently by President Wilson during the last war, this agreement, the Atlantic Charter, had succeeded in drawing up peace terms acceptable to both England and America.

Before drawing the meeting to a close President Roosevelt mentioned Postmaster General Walker as being an ardent supporter of friendly Japanese-American relations. Apparently Mr. Waslker had spoken in behalf of the suggested interview between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye. As the conversation ended, Secretary Hull asked Ambassador Nomura to call him at any time. Since the Chinese Incident was regarded as a separate problem, it had not been mentioned at all in the day's conversation.[71]

17. Ambassador Nomura Discloses His Personal Opinion Regarding the President's Statements

Since President Roosevelt had asked to see him immediately upon his return to Washington, Ambassador Nomura was certain that the American President viewed Japanese-American relations in a grave light. From the contents of the statement concerning the determination of the United States to protect its interests against any further Japanese aggression and from the manner in which President Roosevelt read it during that meeting, it was evident to the Japanese Ambassador that the note had been prepared in advance of the President's return.[72]

On the other hand, the second statement read by President Roosevelt seemed to contain his own attitude and opinions, and, accordingly, Ambassador Nomura believed that President Roosevelt favored the Japanese proposal under certain conditions. Yet when Ambassador Nomura had suggested that the situation depended largely on President Roosevelt's statesmanship, the President answered that it was Japan's responsibility to open the closed door. Ambassador Nomura was of the opinion, nevertheless, that President Roosevelt had other wishes, for he did not doubt that the American President hoped for a favorable change in Japanese-American relations.

According to recent comments in the newspapers, President Roosevelt was fearful lest the United States be drawn into a Far Eastern war, since he believed that there was an equal chance that Japan would attempt further aggression. Nevertheless, Ambassador Nomura was certain that the proposal for a meeting between the leaders of the two governments had considerably lessened the strain in diplomatic relations. However, it was essential that strict secrecy be maintained regarding this meeting, especially in Japan, for attempts would be begun there to make it impossible, if the news leaked out. Ambassador Nomura assured Tokyo that the matter was under careful study and that a full report would be made of any ideas of value.[73]

[70] III, 44.
[71] III, 45-47.
[72] III, 48.
[73] Ibid.

[16]

mice 5.mic.002002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

What’s more, DR3 looks very similar to another receptor implicated in inflammation, says Richard Siegel of the National Institute of Arthritis and Musculoskeletal and Skin Diseases in Bethesda, Md, who was involved in the study.

So, researchers wanted to see where in the chemical pathway of immunity DR3 is active. When Siegel and his colleagues tried to stimulate T cells into action in a petri dish, they found that cells lacking the DR3 receptor could still multiply and differentiate at near normal levels. Subsequent experiments showed that DR3 and its partner TL1A seemed essential only for getting T cells into specific tissue.

“There’s regulation at many stages of immune activation leading to immune mediated-disease,” Siegel says. “It’s not only getting the T cell activated, there’s a critical step that TL1A seems to mediate — getting into target tissue and causing disease.”

To test whether DR3 had a hand in autoimmune response, researchers relied on techniques often used to model asthma and multiple sclerosis in animals. They studied both normal mice and “knockout” mice that lacked the gene to make the DR3 receptor. In both sets, Siegel’s team primed the mice’s immune systems to be allergic to a specific protein. Then the team injected the same protein into the mice’s lungs.
access
Enlargemagnify
Tania Watts

In normal mice, the injection causes T cells to attack lung tissue, leading to extreme airway inflammation. By contrast, mice lacking the DR3 receptor had much less lung inflammation.

To mimic multiple sclerosis in the mice, the group used a similar method, this time inoculating nerve cells rather than the lungs. In normal mice, this method drove T cells to destroy the sheaths covering nerve cells, paralyzing the mice. The knockout mice, by contrast, did not have such nerve damage.

Still immune

While the results suggest DR3 might be a promising candidate for targeted drugs, the team needed to show that mice lacking DR3 could still fight off infections. Existing immune-blocking drugs, called TNF blockers, have revolutionized treatment of autoimmune diseases like Crohn’s disease and rheumatoid arthritis, Siegel says. Yet they can also weaken the body’s defenses and make it more susceptible to disease. “It can reduce host defense to tuberculosis, so now everyone going on TNF blockers has to get TB testing,” he says. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

labs 9.lab.991992 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Hospitals are concerned that a shortage of lab technicians could delay diagnostic test results.


Like the growing shortages of primary-care doctors and nurses, the shrinking ranks of skilled lab workers pose a potential threat to the safety and quality of health care, medical experts warn. Hospitals say it currently can take as much as a year to fill some job openings. And the American Society for Clinical Pathology, which certifies lab professionals, says average job-vacancy rates currently top 50% in some states. The group is lobbying for federal and state funds to keep some academic training programs alive and raise awareness of the problem.

Besides testing for deadly viruses and infections, lab technicians, who currently number about 300,000 nationwide, perform such vital tests as diagnosing heart attacks and identifying cancerous tumors. There is no firm evidence to link the growing shortage of lab professionals to an increase in errors or a national slowdown in getting results to patients. But to head off that eventuality, hospitals and professional groups are taking new steps to increase funding for training and to lure new recruits.

"We're holding everything together with Band-Aids and glue today, but five years from now it's going to be another story," says Susan Cease, lab director for Three Rivers Community Hospital in Grants Pass, Ore., which is owned by Asante Health Systems. She says the hospital has been working with a local community college to provide the hands-on lab training for graduates of a two-year medical lab technician program. The hospital also lets its lab technicians with two-year degrees take online courses toward a bachelor's degree.

Barbara McKenna, president of the American Society for Clinical Pathology, says younger workers haven't been attracted to the field, which requires the same level of education as nursing but doesn't pay as well. Starting salaries for lab technicians range from about $27,000 to $58,000, depending on the job and level of education. And requirements for licensing and certification of lab technicians vary from state to state, which can make it hard to relocate, says Dr. McKenna, who is also associate professor of pathology at the University of Michigan Medical School.
Toiling in Obscurity

Lab workers toil in obscurity deep in the bowels of most hospitals, and most people don't know much about the field, says Carol Wells, director of the clinical laboratory sciences program at the University of Minnesota in Minneapolis. "Everyone knows what a nurse does, but no one sees the workers in the laboratory, who are highly trained and execute the tests that are responsible for about 70% to 80% of all diagnostic and treatment decisions made by physicians," Dr. Wells says. "If we disappeared for a day or two, health care would grind to a halt."

Lab-science-training programs are expensive to run, and while some new degree programs have been started, a third of the training programs at colleges around the country have closed down over the past decade. That bodes poorly for hospitals seeking to fill job openings. The federal government estimates that 138,000 new lab professionals will be needed by 2012 to replace technicians expected to retire, but only 50,000 will be trained by that time.

Quest Diagnostics, which employs about 8,500 lab professionals, making it one of the nation's largest lab companies, currently has about 1,200 job openings nationwide. Some vacancies can take months to fill in areas of the country where training programs have closed, says David W. Norgard, vice president of human resources at Quest. The company often recruits on campuses, pitching lab work as a scientific career for which an advanced degree is not necessary.

Agnes Tyl, 26 years old, is currently enrolled at Western Illinois University, where she is preparing for a second career as a lab technician. Ms. Tyl previously took some science courses in college, but ended up getting a degree in interior design. After finding no jobs in that field, she returned to school, where she spends time peering into a microscope to look for abnormalities in blood cells. "I really see the opportunity to grow and be involved in new technology that will help in patient care," Ms. Tyl says.
[Lab Shortages]
Counting Blood Cells

Lab technicians, who usually work under the direction of a pathologist, perform tests such as analyzing blood, urine and other bodily fluids and tissues for diseases. To diagnose a suspected heart attack, they measure substances that signal cardiac stress or damage. They count the number and types of blood cells to determine the presence of anemia, leukemia and other blood disorders.

Much of the work is painstaking: Histotechnicians, for example, must prepare sections of body tissue by cutting it into thin slices, mounting it on slides and staining the tissue so it can be viewed under a microscope. Patients who want to learn more about what lab professionals do can visit labtestsonline.org, sponsored by various industry groups.

Some labs have had to change their work practices to get by with fewer technicians. Rather than have workers perform only one type of test, for instance, some labs are training technicians in different areas such as hematology and chemistry. By learning to run each other's instruments, technicians can move between areas when the workload requires it. Automation also is reducing the need for additional lab personnel, but experts say the human touch is still essential.

"Many tests are automated, but that doesn't mean a lab monkey can do them," says Dr. Wells of the University of Minnesota. "These machines have to be carefully monitored, and if they spit out a result" that doesn't make sense, only a skilled lab technician will catch a possible discrepancy and "investigate what went wrong," she says.

Several Minnesota institutions are making use of a $3.2 million Department of Labor grant to improve the supply of lab professionals. http://Louis-j-sheehan.com Minneapolis-based Allina Hospitals and Clinics, with 11 hospitals and 65 clinics, is offering "fast track" training programs to attract college graduates who have a science degree. The program requires them to work a year in a lab and then become certified as medical technologists after two or three years, says Jane Renken, Allina's system manager for work-force planning.
Job Vacancies

Some hospitals are pitching a career in lab sciences as an option for workers who have been laid off or downsized in other fields. At Affiliated Community Medical Centers in Willmar, Minn., which runs 11 clinics, some vacant lab jobs have taken as long as six months to fill, causing some backups in labs. Lab manager Judith Raske says she visits career classes at high schools, and job fairs for laid-off workers in other fields, to pitch the notion of a career in lab sciences. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

"Young people have no idea what these jobs entail because no one sees the lab professionals," she says.

turnaround 4.tur.002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

A disease thought to be incurable is now a step closer to losing that dispiriting reputation. Multiple sclerosis, the disabling neuromuscular disease that has resisted effective drug therapy, eases off in some people given a drug normally prescribed for leukemia, researchers report in the Oct. 23 New England Journal of Medicine.

“More than half the patients in this study actually improved a significant amount” when taking the drug alemtuzumab, says study coauthor David Margolin, a neurologist at Genzyme Corp. in Cambridge, Mass., which teamed with an international team of researchers in conducting the trial. “We think this is something very special.”

That optimism is tempered by worrisome side effects that showed up in MS patients taking the drug. Two more large-scale trials of MS patients are now getting under way to address those issues and confirm the positive findings.

In MS, the body’s own immune cells orchestrate an attack on myelin, the fatty sheaths that insulate nerve fibers in the central nervous system. The origins of this mutiny remain a medical mystery, but the disaster that follows is well documented: A torrent of inflammation robs the nerves of their protective myelin, disrupting nerve signals and resulting in the motor control losses that mark MS. In the early stages, MS attacks often come and go in relapsing-and-remitting fashion. In the worst case scenario, the autoimmune assault becomes chronic, leading to irreparable nerve damage and permanent disability.

Enter alemtuzumab, also called Campath. This drug targets a compound called CD52, which appears on T cells and B cells, the prime movers of the immune system. Alemtuzumab works well, killing off nearly all the T and B cells, and thus wiping out a huge portion of a person’s immune system. That’s a good thing if your immune cells are running amok, as in autoimmune disease or leukemia. But it can leave a person vulnerable to infection.

Fortunately, this housecleaning is temporary. Since nascent T and B cells don’t make CD52, they escape the purge and go on to repopulate the immune system anew. That takes a few months for B cells but years for T cells, says study coauthor Alasdair Coles, a neurologist at the University of Cambridge in England.

While the drug has helped patients fight chronic lymphocytic leukemia, testing against MS progressed slowly in the 1990s as researchers mainly tested alemtuzumab in advanced-stage, mostly middle-aged MS patients, with little success.

That approach changed in 2002 when an international team of researchers began testing the drug on younger, less-advanced-stage MS patients over the course of a three-year trial. The scientists enrolled people mainly in their 20s and 30s with MS that was diagnosed only 1.3 years earlier, on average, and who hadn’t been treated for the condition yet.

The researchers randomly assigned 111 to get interferon beta 1a, a standard MS drug given as three injections per week. Another 223 patients received alemtuzumab, delivered in a series of intravenous infusions over five days once a year. Most volunteers getting alemtuzumab got two series of infusions, one at the outset and another after 12 months; 46 received a third course a year after that.

The interferon group was slated to receive regular injections during the three-year trial, but two-fifths stopped taking the drug at some point, most complaining of side effects or lack of effectiveness. All patients were monitored for three years.

Clinical testing showed that disabilities for people on interferon rose on average during the trial but fell in those getting alemtuzumab, a first for a large trial, the authors point out.

Overall, 57 percent of those on alemtuzumab improved during the study, while roughly one-fifth worsened and the others held steady. Of those getting interferon, one-third improved, 41 percent declined and the rest held even.

Over the three years, only 20 percent of the alemtuzumab patients had a relapse, compared with 48 percent of the interferon patients.

What’s more, magnetic resonance imaging, or MRI, of the patients’ brains showed less inflammation in those getting alemtuzumab. The brain can wither in MS patients. Between months 12 and 36 in this study, interferon patients experienced a slight loss of brain volume on average whereas alemtuzumab patients added volume.

Combined, these findings suggest that the drug is somehow promoting brain repair in MS patients. “This is unprecedented. It hasn’t been seen before,” says Coles. “Up until now, no one would have thought this would happen.” He was particularly surprised by the MRI data. “Between 12 and 36 months,” he says, patients getting alemtuzumab “were actually acquiring new tissue in the brain.”

The most common side effect from alemtuzumab concerns the thyroid gland, and 23 percent of patients getting the drug in this trial developed thyroid problems. In some people, the gland becomes overactive; in others, it became underactive. Of those getting inferferon, 3 percent developed thyroid problems.

Immunologist Bibiana Bielekova of the National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke in Bethesda, Md., says these thyroid problems are not always easy to treat. Plus, many patients with early-stage MS and mild symptoms might not relish the risk of developing a new problem, particularly when there are several other options available for treating their MS at that stage.

On the other hand, Margolin says, thyroid problems, if manageable, “might be a fair trade off” since they aren’t as serious as MS.

A dangerous bleeding disorder called ITP, or idiopathic thrombocytopenic purpura, showed up in 3 percent of alemtuzumab patients and 1 percent of interferon patients. ITP patients’ immune cells attack their own blood-clotting platelets, risking hemorrhage. One person on alemtuzumab died from the disorder.

“We are quite aware of how incredibly effective this drug is,” Bielekova says. “But everybody is scared to death of those side effects.”

Margolin says physicians will closely monitor patients’ platelet counts in the two upcoming trials of alemtuzumab.

Previous studies had gauged alemtuzumab’s effects against MS largely in patients who had late-stage disease. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire The drug showed promise, but patients still went downhill, Bielekova says.

Margolin suggests that using alemtuzumab to treat early-stage MS patients “who are still walking around” yields benefits because temporarily knocking out T cells and B cells quells the immune system’s ability to generate inflammation, an early-stage event in MS. “That seems to give the body a chance to recover,” he says. http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN.ORG

The new findings are “remarkable,” says Stephen Hauser, a neurologist at the University of California, San Francisco, writing in the same NEJM issue. This and previous work pitting alemtuzumab against MS represent “thoughtful clinical investigations [that] have advanced the field substantially,” he says. But only long-term testing will establish alemtuzumab’s place in the anti-MS armamentarium, he says.